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Abstract 
 
 
 
The selection of immigrants by skill and education is a central issue in the analysis of 
immigration. Since highly educated immigrants tend to be more successful in host 
country labour markets and less of a fiscal cost it is important to know what determines 
the skill-selectivity of immigration. In this paper we examine the proportions of highly 
educated among migrants from around 80 source countries who were observed as 
immigrants in each of 29 OECD countries in 2000/1.  We develop a variant of the Roy 
model to estimate the determinants of educational selectivity by source and destination 
country. We also estimate the determinants of the share of migrants from different source 
countries in each destination country’s immigrant stock. Two key findings emerge. One 
is that the effects of the skill premium, which is at the core of the Roy model, can be 
observed only after we take account of poverty constraints operating in source countries. 
The other is that cultural links and distance are often more important determinants of the 
proportion of high educated immigrants in different OECD countries than wage 
incentives or policy.  
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Introduction 
In this paper we examine, and attempt to explain, the selection of immigrants 
by education to OECD countries from a wide range of source countries. The 
immigration literature has been much concerned with the mechanisms involved in 
immigrant selection, including economic incentives, immigration policy filters and 
constraints operating in source countries. The debate has been fuelled by concerns 
about the performance of immigrants in developed country labour markets and the 
general finding that the higher are the skills of immigrants, the higher are their 
earnings and employment probabilities, the more positive is their net fiscal 
contribution and the more positive is public opinion towards them and towards 
immigration more generally. Not surprisingly a number of leading immigration 
countries have moved towards greater skill selection in their immigration policies.  
These trends have been accompanied by renewed interest in the ‘brain drain’. 
The gradual increase in migration from poor to rich countries, together with trends in 
skill-selective immigration policy, have given rise to concerns that some of the 
poorest countries are being disadvantaged as their best and brightest leave to seek 
employment in high-wage OECD countries. The recent debate has focused on 
whether the process of high skilled emigration improves education incentives in poor 
countries, thereby replacing some or all of the highly educated emigrants. It has also 
dwelt at length on whether the size and composition of diasporas influence 
development through generating remittances and creating trade as well as through 
return migration and technological transfer. By contrast, relatively few studies have 
focused on what explains the educational selectivity of out-migration across source 
countries and what combination of incentives and policy determines the skill content 
of immigration among the main destinations.     
 The basic framework used in models of skill selection is the Roy model (Roy, 
1951), which was introduced to the literature on international migration in a series of 
influential papers by Borjas (1987, 1994, 1999). The essence of the Roy model is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the destination and origin wage-by-skill schedules 
(assumed to be in present values) facing potential emigrants. In this illustration, the 
destination wage schedule, w(y), is increasing in the individual’s skill or education 
level with a slope that reflects the return to education. If the wage schedule in the 
origin country is w(x)1, the return to education is lower in the origin than at the 
destination. Only those with an education level exceeding s1 will have an incentive to 
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migrate and hence there will be positive selection. By contrast if the origin wage 
schedule is w(x)2 then only those with education below s2 will emigrate and there will 
be negative selection.  
 The position of the home country reservation wage schedule w(x) depends on 
a number of other factors that can be considered as costs. One is the individual’s 
preference for (or compensating differential in favour of) the home country, which 
may differ across individuals thereby introducing greater heterogeneity into selection 
by skill. A second component is the direct cost of migration, which also displaces 
w(x) upwards and may vary by skill level. A third is the cost associated with gaining 
admission through the policy filter, which could vary across individuals and by skill 
level. Finally, some individuals may be constrained from migrating by poverty, an 
issue to which we return below. Two points follow from this analysis. One is that 
even if the wage schedule in country y lies everywhere above the wage schedule in x 
(country x is much poorer) the other components may still ensure that the reservation 
wage schedule crosses the destination wage schedule. Thus selection can still be 
important even when income gaps are large. The second point is that these other 
components may influence the slope of the reservation wage schedule w(x) so that the 
relative slopes of the ‘raw’ (or unadjusted) wage schedules may not be a good guide 
to the skill-selectivity of migration from x to y.  
 In his studies using this framework Borjas (1987, 1992, 1994, 1999) finds that 
the adjusted wage differential for recent immigrants to the US depends negatively on 
source country inequality and positively on average source country income, which 
implies that immigrants from poor and unequal countries are negatively selected 
relative to immigrants from other source countries. Comparison between the US and 
Canada suggests that immigration policies might also matter as more skill-selective 
policies in the latter are associated with better immigrant labour market outcomes 
(Borjas 1993). But this appears to operate largely through the source country 
composition of immigration rather than through differences in the selectivity of 
migrants from a given source country (Borjas 1993; Antecol et al., 2003). 
 More recently, attention has focused on micro-level comparisons of movers 
and stayers, where the probability of migration is related to the estimated return to 
skills at home and abroad. Using this approach Ramos (1992) and Borjas (2006) find 
that migrants from Puerto Rico to the US have less education than non-migrants and 
that returnees are somewhat more educated than out-migrants. This is consistent with 
 3
higher returns to education in Puerto Rico as compared with the US, where there are 
no immigration policy barriers between the two countries. However in a study of 32 
source countries Feliciano (2005) finds that Puerto Rico is the only country for which 
migrants to the US are negatively selected on education relative to the source 
population. This suggests that the presence of immigration policy increases positive 
selection, although there is still a weak negative relationship between the degree of 
positive selection and source country inequality.   Interestingly, Aydemir (2003) finds 
that, for migration from the US to Canada, the high-educated are less likely to apply 
but are more likely to be accepted through Canada’s points system. Overall they are 
positively selected because effect of skill-selective immigration policy outweighs the 
incentive effect that would otherwise favour low skilled migration.  
Much of the recent attention has focused on the large flow across the southern 
US border from Mexico, a much poorer country with a higher return to skills. 
Estimating the wage distribution for migrants had they stayed in Mexico, Chiquiar 
and Hanson (2005) find that migrants are drawn disproportionately from the middle 
and upper middle of the income distribution and that they are over-represented among 
those with 10-15 years of education (see also Orrenius and Zovodny, 2006). This is 
could be accounted for by the low-educated facing higher migration costs, which in 
terms of Figure 1, could make the reservation wage function w(x) convex. Other 
studies have stressed the effects of migration networks in reducing costs and 
increasing the returns to migration. Thus McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) find that 
networks identified in the source country increase the proportion of low educated 
migrants, while Munshi (2003) identifies the positive effects of networks at the 
destination on the employment probabilities and the occupational status of Mexican 
immigrants.  
 These studies have provided much insight into migrant self-selection at the 
micro-level. They stress the fact that migration costs are important and that policy 
barriers could be important in raising the costs e.g. of illegal migration. But they offer 
little insight into the observed differences in the selectivity of migration across 
countries of immigration. Less still do they explain why the skill-or education-content 
of emigration differs so much among countries of origin.  
 By contrast the educational content of emigration has been the central focus of 
the literature on the ‘brain drain’. Recent advances in data collection have improved 
the measurement of the brain drain. By looking at the foreign born by origin country 
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and education in the censuses or population registers of OECD countries it has been 
possible to assemble a much clearer picture of the migrant stock by education for a 
range of source countries. These datasets have been used to test the competing 
hypotheses of brain drain and brain gain. Following Mountford (1997) they have 
sought to estimate whether an increase in the prospects of emigration could increase 
the incentive to acquire human capital by enough to raise education levels even 
among those who, in the event, stay at home (the brain gain). In a series of studies 
Beine et al. (2001, 2003) find a positive effect of skilled migration on the share 
educated (migrants plus non-migrants) across a set of source countries. They estimate 
significant educational offsets although some countries that are small, relatively poor 
and have high emigration rates still suffer substantial net losses of human capital 
(particularly countries in the Caribbean and in Sub-Saharan Africa—see Docquier 
(2006), p. 38). While these studies are important in assessing key consequences of the 
brain drain, they are concerned with its effects rather than its causes; indeed the 
theoretical model of migration is one where those who attain a threshold education 
level are randomly chosen for emigration.  
 Here we focus on the factors that drive the educational selectivity of migration 
across both sources and destinations—something that has been neglected in recent 
work. However in a recent paper Docquier et al. (2006) estimate models of migration 
to OECD countries by skill level. Their focus is on the concentration among OECD 
destinations of (the stock of) migrants from different source countries. For both 
tertiary-educated and low-educated migrants they find that the concentration in a 
destination decreases with distance from the source and increases with former colonial 
links, with linguistic and cultural proximity, and with the size and prosperity of the 
destination. Interestingly they find that high-educated migration is more responsive to 
distance and economic incentives while unskilled migrants tend to be more sensitive 
to colonial ties and linguistic barriers and more responsive to the generosity of welfare 
programs in destination countries.  
A second recent paper related to ours is by Brücker and Defoort (2006). They 
use a panel data of immigration flows (by education level) to 6 OECD countries over 
the period 1975-2000. They use the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality and 
include a series of measures of geographical and cultural distances between countries. 
Like us, they investigate the determinants of skill selectivity across countries. They 
find a positive correlation between inequality in the sending country (measured by the 
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gini coefficient) and the immigration selectivity, which is a priori inconsistent with 
the Roy model. Our data show a similar pattern, as we will show in the next section. 
They introduce an extended version of the Roy model where they allow for a negative 
correlation between skill levels and individual moving costs. This extended model 
predicts than immigration selectivity could increase with inequality and, therefore, 
reconcile the theory with the evidence. However, they do not directly test this 
assumption.  
 In what follows we use a dataset similar to that analysed by Docquier et al 
(2006), which counts migrants to the OECD by destination, by source and by 
education level. However, here we use the framework of the Roy model and we focus 
more on educational selectivity from the source country perspective.  
 
Educational Selectivity by Source and Destination 
 Our measures of the educational selectivity of migration are based on a dataset 
constructed at the OECD by Dumont and Lemaître (2004). This covers the stock of 
foreign-born in all OECD countries in 2000/01 from all source countries by three 
levels of education and is discussed in more detail in the data appendix. Here we 
focus on the share of migrants aged 15 and over that has some tertiary education, 
which we label as the high educated.  
Table 1 looks at these migrants from the destination country perspective. The 
first column shows each destination country’s share of the foreign born aged 15 and 
over in the OECD. The United States is by far the largest host country with 41.7 
percent of the total, while other traditional immigration countries, Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand account for a further 13.0 percent. The EU-15 accounts for 37.4 
percent of the OECD total with Germany the largest individual host country followed 
by France and the UK. Other countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere contribute 
modestly to the total. The second column shows, for each country, the percentage of 
the population aged 15 and over that is foreign-born. As is well-known, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand have immigrant shares of over 20 percent--rates that are 
matched only by Switzerland and Luxembourg. Less well known is the fact that seven 
other members of the EU-15 have immigrant shares that are over 10 percent and only 
little less that the United States at 14.3 percent. 
The third column of Table 1 reports the percentage of the foreign-born in each 
host country that is tertiary educated. Among the countries with skill-selective points 
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systems, Canada, and Australia have ratios of 37-38 percent, which are especially 
high when compared with European countries many of which have ratios of less than 
20 percent. Notable exceptions in Europe are the UK and Ireland, while Norway and 
Sweden also have ratios of over 20 percent. Outside of Europe there are high ratios 
for some countries with very low immigration such as Japan. Korea and Mexico 
which have relatively few source countries (in the case of Mexico 70 percent are US-
born).  
Clearly a variety of factors contribute to the high-educated share of 
immigration. One is the extent to which different destination countries select 
immigrants from a given source more or less positively. To shed some light on this we 
calculate an adjusted high education ratio that applies the total high-educated ratio of 
emigrants to the OECD from each source country to the weight of that country in each 
destination’s immigration. Thus if the figure in column (3) exceeds that in column (4) 
then the destination country in question selects higher educated immigrants from a 
given source (on average) as compared with other destinations. Just to take a few 
examples, Australia and Canada, as well as the US and Mexico, tend to select 
relatively high-educated immigrants given their source country composition. By 
contrast most European countries have high-educated immigrant shares that are lower 
than their source country composition would suggest. Nevertheless the correlation 
coefficient of 0.76 between columns (3) and (4) indicates the much of the variation in 
high-education ratios is driven by the way in which the pool of migrants from 
different sources is distributed across destinations. 
Column (5) takes this little further by applying the source country weights of 
immigration for each destination to the high education share of the residents aged 15 
and over in the source countries taken from Barro and Lee (2000). Although this does 
not count the emigrants as part of the source country population it gives an indication 
of the extent to which each destination draws migrants from relatively high education 
countries. As is well-known, high education rates are much lower in the source 
country populations than they are for migrants, and the variation of this weighted 
average across destinations is also somewhat less than among migrants. But the 
correlation coefficient between columns (3) and (5) is 0.47, which suggests that some 
part of the variation across destinations in the immigrant education mix is associated 
with source country characteristics. Of course this may itself reflect the processes of 
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self-selection and policy as well as other links between specific sources and 
destinations.  
Table 2 examines migrants to the OECD from the perspective of the source 
region. The first column shows the percentage of OECD immigrant stock that is 
accounted for by different source regions. A large proportion (46 percent) of these are 
intra-OECD migrants, while in terms of continents, 29.5 percent come from the 
Americas, 35.3 percent come from Europe (including the former Soviet Union) and 
24.4 percent come from Asia (including the Middle East). The second column shows 
for each sending region the percentage of its emigrants that are high educated. As 
might be expected, the  ratios are relatively high (30 percent or above) for North 
America, Australia/New Zealand and Northwestern Europe. But the education content 
is also high for emigrants from most of Asia, from the former Soviet Union and from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. To some degree this is reflected by the (migrant weighted) 
percentages of high educated residing in each region’s source countries (column 3). 
Although the correlation coefficient between columns between columns (2) and (3) is 
0.5, there are substantial deviations. For countries in Asia and Africa the high-
educated share among emigrants is far higher than that of the source country 
populations—a result that remains true even when the emigrants are added back to the 
source populations. In some other cases such as Central America, Southern Europe 
and North America the gap between emigrants and source country populations is 
small or even negative. These comparisons immediately raise the question of how 
such large differences in educational selection across countries and regions can be 
accounted for.  
Before moving to a more formal analysis of these data, it is worth looking to 
see if the relationships suggested by the Roy model can be observed in crude 
correlations on country-level data. Migration studies often use the gini coefficient of 
household income as a proxy for the return to skills. However this variable is far from 
ideal as it measures income from all sources and it reflects the proportions at each 
income level. Instead we have constructed a measure of the return to skill based on 
wage rates for different occupations from Freeman and Oostendorp’s (2001) dataset 
(see data appendix). Figure 2 provides scatter plots of the relationship between the 
share of high-educated immigrants by destination (Table 1 column 3) and the 
destination country skill premium. The Roy model predicts that this relationship 
should be upward sloping. Figure 2 shows that there is very little relationship between 
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the education content of immigration and destination skill premium. Thus the effects 
of incentives on selection by education are not easily observed across OECD 
destinations.1 However, as we have noted above, such effects might be masked by 
differences in the source country composition of immigration and/or by differences in 
immigration policy.  
The relationship between the skill content of migration and economic 
incentives should be more clearly observed by comparing those who have emigrated 
from source countries with those who stayed. Figure 3 plots the percentage point 
difference between the high-educated shares of movers and stayers (the country-level 
equivalents to the ratio of columns (2) and (3) in Table 2) against our measure of the 
wage premium. According to the Roy model, this relationship should be downward 
sloping: the greater the source country wage premium, the lower the proportion of 
high-educated emigrants relative to non-emigrants.   The result is even more 
disconcerting for the Roy model. As Figure 3 shows, the relationship is strongly 
upward sloping. Thus either the Roy model is not a very good characterisation of 
migrant selection at the global level or else the effects of economic incentives are 
being obscured by other influences. In order to investigate this further we first outline 
a model of how such influences might operate.          
 
Theoretical Framework 
Selection by skill has been a central focus of much of the literature that 
employs some variant of the Roy model. Here we use a modified version of this 
framework. We characterise the probability that an individual migrates as depending 
on three components. The first is the probability that the individual finds it in his or 
her interest to migrate on cost-benefit grounds. The second is immigration policy 
through which migrants are screened. And third there is selection at the origin, arising 
from the fact that some individuals may be too poor to afford the costs of migration. 
The incentive for individual i to migrate, Ii, is the difference between the 
utility from the economic gains and the non-economic loss or compensating 
differential. 
                                                 
1 We did a similar comparison using the gini coefficient of household income as a measure of the return 
to skills. This also produced little evidence of a strong positive relationship. The correlation coefficient 
between our measure and the gini coefficient is 0.41 and is significant at the 1% level.  
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ixiyii zUUI −−=           (1) 
where Uy and Ux are economic utility at the destination and the origin respectively and 
z is the compensating differential representing the individual’s non-economic 
preferences, all assumed to be in present value terms. In order to capture 
heterogeneity in individual preferences we assume that zi is a random variable with 
mean 0>z  reflecting a positive average preference for the origin country. Assuming 
logarithmic utility we can express the incentive to migrate as  
ixiyii zcwwI −+−= )ln(ln , or i
xi
xiyii zw
cwwI −+−−= )1ln(lnln    (2) 
where wy and wx are earnings in the destination and origin respectively and c is the 
direct cost of migration.  
Earnings in origin and destination depend on education and a random 
unobserved productivity component, while earnings at the destination also depend on 
a term representing the ‘cultural’ distance between the origin and the destination: 
xiixi sw εααln 10 ++= , and yiiiyi susw ε)ββ(ββln 3210 +−−+=    (3) 
where si is individual i’s education level, which we assume is bounded by 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 
(later we will assign the value 1 to the high educated and 0 to the low educated). We 
assume that the unobserved components of the wage εx and εy have mean zero and are 
uncorrelated with the individual’s preference for migration. The term u is a measure 
of ‘cultural distance’ between the source and the destination that affects the 
transferability of educational skills. The greater the cultural distance the less 
transferable are these skills and therefore the lower is the wage in the destination. 
High education may help bridge the culture gap so that if β3 > 0 the wage penalty is 
lower for the more highly educated. On the other hand cultural difference may have 
smaller effects on productivity in low education jobs where there is little human 
capital to be transferred, in which case β3 < 0. 
We characterise the direct cost of migration simply as )1( isd γ− , where d is a 
measure of the direct costs, which decline with education level. Hence the 
individual’s incentive to migrate is: 
iixiyiiii zsddususI −+−−++−−+−= 1321100 γεεββ)αβ(αβ    (4) 
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Immigration policy acts as a screen and it may be skill selective. We interpret 
immigration policy as raising the costs of migration such that the policy cost for 
individual i is: 
ii sP 10 δ−δ=           (5) 
If policy is not skill-selective then δ1 = 0.  An across-the-board toughening in policy 
raises the policy cost of immigration by increasing δ0, while an increase in skill-
selectivity holding overall toughness constant can be achieved increasing both δ0 and 
δ1. 
 An important feature of our model is the poverty constraint; people living 
close to subsistence find it much more difficult to migrate. While it might seem 
possible to borrow, it will be difficult to provide collateral based on future earnings 
when the purpose of the loan is to leave the country.  Thus, the greater are the 
migration costs, the higher is the general incidence of poverty in the origin country, 
and the more likely a given individual is to be poor, the less likely that he/she will be 
able to migrate. We express the poverty constraint effect as the product of these three 
factors: 
)1( iii srCR −=           (6) 
where r is the general poverty rate and Ci represents the total cost of migration 
including both the direct cost and the policy cost. These costs could be prohibitive for 
a low educated individual in a poor country facing sufficiently high migration costs. 
Substituting direct and policy costs as defined above, the poverty cost can be 
expressed as: 
)1())(( 110 iii srsddR −δ+γ−δ+=         (7) 
Provided that the sum of migration costs is positive, the poverty cost Ri is increasing 
in the poverty rate and decreasing in s up to s = 1. Putting together the incentive to 
migrate, the policy cost and the poverty cost, the probability that individual i will 
migrate is: 
)εε)1())δγ(δ(
)δγβαβ(βδαβPr()1Pr(
10
13112000
yixiiii
ii
zsrsdd
sduudm
−+>−+++−
+++−+−−−−==
   (8) 
We characterise the total migration rate as depending on these variables such 
that:  
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)δγβαβ(βδαβ
10
13112000
    (9) 
where s is the mean of si . We assume two education levels, high educated, si = 1, and 
low educated, si = 0, and thus s is the share of high-educated in the population. The 
migration rate for high-educated individuals is:  
zduud
N
M
H
H −+++−+−−−−= 13112000 δγβαββδαβ    
 (10) 
And the migration rate for low-educated individuals is 
zrdud
N
M
L
L −+−−−−−= )δ(βδαβ 02000      
 (11) 
And the difference between the migration rates of the high- and the low-educated is:  
rddu
N
M
N
M
L
L
H
H )δ(δγβαβ 011311 +++++−=−     
 (12) 
As in the Roy model, an increase in the return to skills in the destination 
relative to the origin increases positive selection. In this specific case an increase in β1 
– α1 increases migration among the high educated but not among the low educated.  
Cultural distance affects selection through β3, which could be positive or negative.  
Positive selection is also related to direct migration costs through dγ1 and through the 
policy selectivity term δ1. Finally, the degree of poverty, r, reduces unskilled 
migration and therefore increases positive selection, both directly and through the 
interaction with migration costs.  
 
Estimating framework and data 
We use the theoretical approach above to motivate an empirical model of 
migrant selectivity from country x to country y by specifying the following estimating 
equation: 
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The dependent variable is the log of the share of high educated in the total migration 
from x to y divided by the share of high educated in the population of origin country x. 
This measures the educational selectivity of migration from x to y. The first of the 
explanatory variables is the difference in the wage premium for high over low 
educated workers between the destination and source countries. The basic test of the 
Roy model is that a1 > 0.  Because of the restriction imposed on the two wage ratios 
this variable varies by origin and by destination. The second term is cultural distance 
which is specific to each country pair and which could be positive or negative in sign. 
The distance between x and y, which varies across bilateral pairs, is a proxy for direct 
migration costs. Since these are less of a deterrent to the high educated we expect that 
a3 > 0.  
The fourth and fifth terms capture the poverty constraint that affects the low 
educated in poor countries. The effect of poverty is to increase high education 
selectivity, the more so the higher are the costs of migration.   Hence we expect a4 > 0 
and a5 > 0. The interacted term varies by source and destination but the poverty rate 
varies only by the origin country. Immigration policy is destination specific and it 
may be skill selective. In the absence of a measure the two elements of policy--overall 
toughness and educational selectivity--we introduce a dummy variable for each 
destination country. This is represented as Poly, and it will also capture any other 
destination specific effects.  
The theory set out in the previous section considers only one source and one 
destination country but in our empirical model we estimate migration from a given 
source to a number of different destinations. So third country effects could potentially 
matter. Consider the case in which different destinations y = 1…n  are imperfect 
substitutes and  the benefit of each destination  (net of destination-specific reservation 
wage costs) is summarised by wy and the benefit associated with the source country is 
ωx. For destination country k this model may be written:  
 13
∑
≠
ω−ω−ω−ω=
n
ky
kyxk
TxHx
TkxHkx ee
NN
MM
)()()
/
/
ln( 21     
 (14) 
where e2 is a symmetric cross-destination effect. By adding and subtracting ωk inside 
the bracket of the second term this can be re-written as: 
)()()
/
/
ln( 21 kyxk
TxHx
TkxHkx nee
NN
MM ω−ω−ω−ω=     
 (15) 
where jω is the mean across all destinations (including k), and since this is common 
across all destinations the second term can be treated as a destination fixed effect. 
  The data that we use for the numerator of our dependent variable is the share 
of migrants aged over 15 from a source country to an OECD destination country that 
have some tertiary education.  As noted earlier, this stock data for the year 2000 
comes from Dumont and Lemaître (2004). The denominator is the share of the source 
country population aged 15 and over with some tertiary education in 2000, based on 
the Barro and Lee (2000) database. In order to obtain the population at risk, we add 
back the emigrants to the OECD to the source country numbers of high-educated and 
total emigrants to the Barro-Lee estimates for each source country.  
As noted earlier we measure the skill premium using wage rates rather than 
relying on the gini coefficient of household income, which has often been used as a 
measure of the return to skills. Our measure of the skill premium is the ratio of the 
wage in a set of occupations that normally require some tertiary education to the wage 
in a set of unskilled occupations. These are calculated from Freeman and Oostendorp 
and cover the years 1983 to 2003. The percentage in poverty is the World Bank’s 
estimate of the proportion of population living with incomes of less than $2 per day 
for the available year nearest to 2000. Because this is only available for a recent year 
and because of missing data we develop an alternative measure of poverty using the 
share of agriculture in GDP. Across the source countries in our data for which the 
World Bank poverty share is non-zero the correlation between poverty and the 
agricultural share in 2000 is 0.85. For our alternative poverty measure we apply the 
prediction from a regression of poverty on the agricultural share to the average 
agricultural share over the years 1950 to 2000. One advantage is that this reflects 
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average poverty levels for the period over which almost all of the migration took 
place.  
The costs of migration are reflected in the distance between the capitals of the 
source and destination countries. Variables that are intended capture the cultural 
distance between the source and the destination include dummies for having a 
common official or primary language and having a post-colonial relationship. We also 
include a measure of linguistic proximity, which is based on the number of nodes 
between one language and another on the linguistic tree. Further details of the 
definition and sources of the variables can be found in the Data Appendix.  
 
Results for Educational Selection  
Our estimates of different variants of the model appear in Table 3. Column (1) 
shows the results for a baseline specification that includes the wage premium 
differential and the variables that reflect geographical and cultural distance between 
the source and destination countries, but excluding the destination country dummies. 
This produces a negative coefficient on the wage premium differential, which is the 
opposite of what the Roy model would predict, although it is not significant. When 
the destination dummies are included in column (2) we find that the coefficient 
becomes positive although it remains small and insignificant. One reason is that, 
across source countries, the wage premium is positively correlated with poverty. Thus 
the source country wage ratio would be capturing a mixture of the ‘true’ negative 
effect on selection through the wage premium and the positive selection effect 
operating through the poverty constraint. 
 The third column of the table adds controls for the World Bank’s $2 per day 
poverty rate and the interaction between distance and poverty. Our model predicts that 
the effect of poverty should matter more the further away the source country is from 
the destination country and so both the main effect and the interaction should take 
positive coefficients.  The results strongly support the hypothesis that poverty matters. 
We find that the estimates of a4 and a5 are both positive and significant, that is, poor 
countries are associated with more positive selection and the further away they are the 
stronger is this effect. Introducing these poverty variables has a dramatic effect on the 
coefficient of the wage premium differential, which now has the predicted sign and is 
strongly significant. That is, controlling for poverty, we find that source countries 
with a higher wage premium are associated with more negative selection. More 
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precisely, the estimated elasticity of skill selection with respect to the wage premium 
differential is around 0.37.  Column (4) uses instead our measure of poverty imputed 
from the agricultural share. This expands the number of available observations and it 
produces results that are similar to those in column (3) using the direct measure of 
poverty.  
 As noted earlier we have no clear prediction for the effects of cultural 
distance. On the one hand high education may make it easier to bridge the cultural 
gap, in which case cultural distance should lead to positive skill selection. On the 
other hand for the lower educated with fewer skills to transfer, cultural distance may 
be less of a barrier, in which case it may lead to negative selection. The results in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 suggest that the transferability of human capital may 
be highly sensitive to the sharing of a common language; and that cultural proximity 
does not necessarily enhance the transferability of human capital but reduces the costs 
of migration for low-skilled workers more than for high-skilled workers. The negative 
effect of colonial history may reflect the long-term effects of the initially low barriers 
to immigration from post-independence colonies that generated persistent streams of 
low-skilled migrants.  Finally, distance has a positive coefficient, as we would expect, 
even in the presence of the interaction with poverty. Thus migration costs increase 
positive selection, but more so for poor source countries.  
The results so far suggest a strong role for poverty in explaining the patterns of 
skill selection, and we explore this further by looking at poor and rich countries 
separately. We label source countries as “poor” if their poverty rate is higher than 
10% and as “rich” if their poverty rate is smaller than 5%.2 We then estimate the 
model separately for each of these two groups. For the poor countries, we estimate a 
model with and without the poverty variables, to identify precisely the role played by 
poverty in skill selection. The results are reported in Table 4. These results confirm 
our previous results. The elasticity of skill selection with respect to the wage premium 
differential is twice as large in rich countries as in poor countries, when we do not 
control for poverty rates. Once we do (column (3)), we find a coefficient for the wage 
premium differential that is comparable to the one for rich countries and we find that 
poverty itself also increases positive selection . The results with the imputed poverty 
                                                 
2 We experimented with alternative classifications of countries and found very similar results. 
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rates (column (4)) are very similar to those with the poverty variables, as we found 
earlier.  
One worry with the results so far is that the wage premium may be 
endogenous. For example, suppose that the mechanism determining emigration and 
skill selection are in line with our model. If a country experienced a large emigration 
of the high-skilled labour force (e.g. a typical case of brain drain), we would expect 
this to affect the wage premium: presumably, the wage premium will increase as high-
skilled workers leave the country. Since our measure of wage premium is an average 
measure covering a period overlapping with the actual migration movements, we 
could find that countries with a relatively high wage premium are associated with 
more positive selection, which would simply be driven by reverse causality. In terms 
of our estimates, this endogeneity problem works against us, as it would bias the OLS 
estimates of the wage premium differential downwards. Ideally, we would like to 
instrument for the wage premium. However, it is hard to think of a variable that would 
affect the wage premium only, without affecting the incentives to emigrate directly.  
Instead, we investigate the potential endogeneity problem by comparing the 
results for small and large countries. Presumably, the wage premium will be more 
sensitive to emigration patterns in small countries than in large countries. Comparing 
small and large countries should provide some evidence on the existence of an 
endogeneity problem. The results appear in Table 5. We report two different set of 
estimates, for different samples of source countries: (1) population smaller than 7.5 
millions , (2) population larger than 20 millions. The results go exactly in the 
direction we would expect: We find a positive and significant coefficient for the wage 
premium differential in large countries, and find a negative coefficient in small 
countries. The inclusion of poverty rates increases the coefficient of the wage 
premium differential, but does not help in reversing the coefficient in the case of small 
countries.  These results indicate that endogeneity is an issue indeed and our estimate 
of the elasticity of skill selection is likely to be a lower bound.  
 
Total Migration 
So far we have focused on educational selection from a given source country. But 
differences in the educational content of migration by destination are also the result of 
the mix of countries from which the migrants are drawn. In order to estimate total 
migration from source to destination we specify the empirical counterpart to equation 
 17
(9) in terms of the share of each source country in the immigration of a given 
destination country, taking the population of the source country over to the right hand 
side: 
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Using immigrant shares as the dependent variable standardises for the very different 
scale of migration across destinations. The first two explanatory variables represent 
the wage gaps for high and low skills weighted by the share of high educated in the 
source country population.  The coefficients are predicted to be positive and equal, b1 
= b2 > 0, but we do not impose this restriction initially. The coefficient b3 is expected 
to be negative: the larger the cultural distance the lower the share of immigration, but 
the interaction with the share of high educated is ambiguous for the reasons noted 
earlier. If the policy costs are less for skilled migrants we predict that b5 > 0. The costs 
of migration associated with distance are expected to have a negative effect but less so 
for skilled migrants, so that b6 < 0 and b7 > 0. The two terms involving poverty relate 
to low-educated potential migrants; poverty is expected to reduce immigration, the 
more so the greater the distance; hence b8  < 0 and b9 < 0. Finally source country 
population should positively affect the destination share with a unit elasticity, b10 = 1, 
although we do not impose this restriction.  
 The results of estimating this equation appear in Table 6. We exclude 
destination dummies since our dependent variable is a share and is therefore 
normalised for total migration to the destination. In column (1) we find that the 
unskilled wage differential, representing the overall wage gap is positive and 
significant as predicted. However, the wage premium differential that captures the 
effect of skill selection on total immigration is highly insignificant. This seems to be a 
result of the collinearity between these two variables, which, by construction, contain 
common components. When in column (2) we impose the restriction that b1 = b2, the 
coefficient is positive and significant and the restriction is not rejected. For the 
variables representing cultural distance, the main effects are all significant and 
positive, while the interactions with the high-educated share of the source country 
population are uniformly insignificant. Thus the effects on the educational selectivity 
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that were found in Table 3 are hard to observe for aggregate migration when the main 
effects are also included. When these interactions are dropped, as in column (2), the 
main effects remain strongly positive, underlining the importance of shared colonial 
history, common language and language proximity in determining the source country 
composition of total immigration.  
 Turning to the variables that represent the costs of migration we find, in 
keeping with most other studies, that the effect of distance is strongly negative. And 
as predicted, the interaction of distance with the share of high educated gives a 
positive coefficient, indicating that the costs of migration are less of a barrier to the 
more highly educated. This is consistent with the finding in Table 3 that educational 
selection is more positive the greater is the distance from source to destination. The 
interaction between the share of the source country population in poverty and the 
share with low education is negative as predicted, supporting the view that it is 
principally the low educated who are constrained by poverty. This too is consistent 
with the finding in Table 3 that the more widespread is poverty in a source country the 
more positively selected are the emigrants from that country. Finally, the interaction 
between distance, poverty and the low educated share is posititve contrary to 
expectation but the coefficient is small and insignificant and so this interaction is 
dropped in the second column.  
 The results of estimating unrestricted and restricted versions of the equation  
using our imputed measure of poverty appear in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. As 
noted earlier, using predicted values of poverty based on the share of the labour force 
in agriculture allows us to include a wider range of source countries. The results are 
little changed from those using the direct measure of poverty. In columns (3) and (4) 
the coefficient on the source country population now becomes insignificantly different 
from one although we do not impose this restriction. 
 The coefficient on the share of the source country population that is high 
educated is not significant in any of the four regressions in Table 6. In columns (2) 
and (4) several of the interactions with the educational share are dropped, although it 
still works positively through the interactions with distance and with poverty. 
However the main effect remains negative and insignificant.  
 
The Effects of Fundamentals and Policy across the OECD 
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A key question in recent debates has been: how far can differences in the skill 
selectivity of immigration among OECD countries be explained by wage differentials 
and other fundamentals such as distance and poverty, and how much remains to be 
explained by destination-specific factors including policy?  Our estimates of the 
educational selectivity of migration and the share of each source country in the total 
allow us to decompose the sources of difference in the overall proportion of high-
educated immigrants. For destination country y the proportion high-educated 
immigrants is:  
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The first term in the summation is the source by destination educational selectivity 
that we estimated in Table 3. The second term is the source country composition of 
the destination’s immigration, which we estimated in Table 6.  
In order to assess the effect of fundamentals and policy factors on the overall 
proportion of high-educated immigrants, we construct counterfactual predictions 
substituting one by one each of these fundamentals by the mean across all 
destinations, holding all else constant, including the residual. For example, in the 
educational selectivity equation, we calculate the following counterfactual for the 
wage premium differential: 
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where the iaˆ  are the estimated coefficients from column (4) in Table 3 and yxηˆ  are the 
corresponding residuals. The second term on the right is the mean across all 
destinations of the differential with source country x. Clearly, the variables that matter 
are those that differ only between destinations or that differ across bilateral pairs.  
Any variable for which the variation is only across source countries will drop out.  
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In a similar manner we generate a counterfactual predication for the wage 
differential working through the composition equation, using the coefficients in 
column (4) of Table 6. This counterfactual is constructed in the same way as that for 
educational selectivity in equation (20), except that the sum of the shares, for the 
source countries in our sample, are constrained to add up to one for each destination.  
We then construct a counterfactual for the overall proportion of high-educated 
immigrants in a given destination country: 
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Finally we calculate the difference between the actual value for the overall share of 
high educated migrants at a given destination (based on the sample used in the 
regression analysis) and the counterfactual value for the counterfactual.   
We also calculate a counterfactual for the joint effect of all the fundamentals, 
working through the education selectivity equation alone, by setting all the relevant 
explanatory variables at their global means while holding the source country 
composition constant. Similarly we calculate a counterfactual for the joint effect of 
fundamentals working though the source country composition equation by 
substituting all fundamentals by the means across all destinations, holding educational 
selection constant. For each destination, we then compare the actual value and these 
counterfactual values of the education selectivity and the source country composition 
separately, such that we can assess whether the fundamentals mostly work through the 
education selectivity or the source country composition. 
Table 7 reports the differences between the actual proportion of high-skilled in 
total immigration and the predicted values based on the counterfactual. A positive 
number indicates that the fundamentals of that particular destination country make a 
positive contribution to the proportion of high-skilled in its total immigration. Some 
OECD countries are dropped from this table (notably Germany) because, as a result of 
missing data, the share of total immigration covered by our estimates is less than fifty 
percent of the total. For each destination the share of immigration covered by the 
source countries in our regressions appears in the last column of the table.  
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Column (1) of the table is the actual share of high educated migrants for each 
destination, over the source countries in our sample. Column (2) reports the 
counterfactual difference for variables working through the educational selectivity 
equation, while column (3) reports the counterfactual difference for the variables 
working through the composition equation. To illustrate, the first row of column (2) 
shows that, for Australia, the overall proportion of high educated is 5.69 percentage 
points higher as a result of variables working through the educational selectivity 
equation than it would have been if these variables were set at the mean for all 
countries. Column (3) shows that the effect of variables working through the source 
country composition contributes to 2.37 percentage points to the high-educated 
proportion.  Across the countries in the table, there is a positive correlation of 0.53 
between the counterfactual difference working through educational selectivity and the 
high education shares in column (1). However, this counterfactual includes the effect 
of the destination dummies and the correlation is much lower (at 0.28) if the dummies 
are excluded from the counterfactual calculation.  Selection effects work particularly 
strongly for Canada and Ireland and also for Portugal and the UK. The country 
composition effects reported in column (3) are typically somewhat smaller and the 
correlation between these counterfactual differences and the overall high education 
shares in column (1) is 0.36. The countries that benefit most from composition effects 
are Mexico and the US.  
Columns (4)-(10) report counterfactual differences for each variable 
separately, but allowing the effects to work through both equations. Column (4) 
shows the effect of the low wage differential, which works only through country 
composition. The effects look surprisingly small. Although wage gaps between 
countries have substantial effects on the source country composition of immigration 
the effect of these compositional shifts on the overall educational mix is relatively 
modest. High wage countries such as the US and Luxembourg benefit slightly from 
their ability to attract migrants from relatively rich countries while Mexico does not.  
Not surprisingly the effects of differences in destination skill premia are more 
important, and they operate largely through the selection equation rather than the 
composition equation. For Australia, Denmark, Japan Norway and Sweden, with 
relatively low skill premia, the share high educated is reduced by at least two 
percentage points. Consistent with other studies that we find that the effect is positive 
for Mexico, where the large skill premium raises the high educated share by 7 
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percentage points. There are also modest positive effects for countries such as 
Portugal and New Zealand. However the effects are generally fairly small relative to 
the overall gap in the share of high educated. Thus even though we find strong 
support for the Roy model in our regressions once we allow for poverty, differences in 
wage premium make only a modest contribution to the overall share of high educated 
between destinations--even though they include the composition effect as well as the 
selection effect.   
As columns (6), (7) and (8) show, for most countries cultural differences have 
larger effects, but not always in the way that might have been anticipated. The effects 
of colonial links are surprisingly small. Although they work negatively through the 
education selection equation, the effects on composition are generally offsetting. Thus 
for former colonial powers such France Portugal and the UK, the colonial legacy 
shifts the composition towards countries with higher than average skills but selects 
negatively from those countries.   
By contrast, the net effect of sharing a common language has much larger 
effects. As we have seen sharing a common language has a positive effect on 
educational selectivity and on the share of migrants drawn from the source country. 
This effect is positive and large for English speaking countries and again it is largely 
driven by educational selection rather than by source country composition. Former 
British colonies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand might have been 
expected to benefit from having a large share of migrants from the UK, but for these 
the composition effects are small and negative. The selection effects of a common 
language are strongest for countries that share a common language with a number of 
source countries—either English-speaking or multilingual destination countries such 
as Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland.  By contrast the effects are negative for 
countries such as Denmark, Japan, Norway and Turkey.   
The effects of linguistic proximity are also moderately large but they work 
negatively through the educational selection equation and positively through the 
composition equation. Overall, the former channel tends to be more important and 
hence the effect of linguistic proximity largely offset the common language effect on 
the overall share of high educated. Mexico and the US are the only two countries for 
which common language and linguistic proximity both have positive effects. For both 
these countries the effect of source country composition on linguistic proximity 
outweighs the direct effect of educational selection.   The result for the US contrasts 
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sharply with the other English speaking countries where the compositional effects of 
linguistic distance are strongly negative.  
Geographic distance works positively through the education selection equation 
but it has ambiguous effects in the composition equation as a result of the interaction 
with the source country high education share. Some of the effects are quite large and, 
because of the non-linearity of the model the absolute values should be treated with 
caution. However the magnitudes are as might have been expected, with large positive 
effects for Australia, Japan and New Zealand, which are distant from the main sources 
of immigration. For Australia and New Zealand and also for Canada, both educational 
selection and composition contribute strongly to the overall positive effect of distance. 
With the exception of these countries and the US the other countries are relatively 
close to their sources of immigration and as a result the educational selectivity from a 
given source is much less positive. 
Because of the non-linearity of the equations that are used to construct the 
counterfactuals, the individual effects cannot be added up. Hence it is difficult to 
measure residual effects that might be associated with policy. However, we can 
examine the effects of the destination country dummies working through the 
educational selection equation (column (10)). It is difficult to see patterns in these 
effects that can easily be associated with policy. For example, among those countries 
with skill-selective points systems the country effect is strongly positive for Canada, 
close to zero for Australia and strongly negative for New Zealand. Similarly, the open 
borders within the EU might be expected to lead to less positive selection than where 
immigration is subject to controls. Yet here too there is no obvious pattern, with large 
negative effects for Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal and large positive effects 
for Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK.  
One interesting possibility is that countries that ‘export’ higher education tend 
to convert some proportion of their foreign students into highly educated permanent 
migrants. Rosenzeweig (2006) finds that the inflow of students to the US five times as 
large as the flow of immigrants admitted on employment based visas, and that a 
significant proportion (perhaps as large as 30 percent), stay on after their studies. 
Furthermore there is evidence that student flows respond to skill premia as the Roy 
model would suggest. But there is little evidence that this can account for differences 
in the high educated share of immigrants between destination countries. The 
correlation across OECD countries of a measure of ‘foreign student intensity’ and the 
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shares of high educated in column (1) of Table 7 is 0.05.3 And the correlation between 
this measure and the dummies in column (10) is –0.07. Thus there is little evidence 
that differences in the recruitment of foreign students can explain the ex post skills of 
immigrants across the OECD.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined, and attempted to explain, the selection by 
education of immigrants from a wide variety of source countries into the countries of 
the OECD. Since the labour market quality of immigrants is of increasing concern to 
developed-country governments, it is important to know what are the key forces 
determining the educational selectivity of immigration. Although considerable 
research has been devoted to differences in selection and outcomes for immigrants to 
a given destination (usually the US) there have been few attempts to analyse this 
selection across source and destination countries. As a result it has not been possible 
to fully explore the predictions of standard migration theory. 
Broadly speaking our results contain two main findings. The first relates to the 
Roy model, which predicts that the greater the return to skills in the destination as 
compared to the source country, the stronger will be the positive selection of 
immigrants by skill-level.  This effect is not observed in the simplest model but it 
reappears once we allow for the fact that many potential immigrants in poor counties 
are constrained from migrating by poverty. This explains the paradox that migrants 
from poor countries, where the returns to education and skills are large, are strongly 
positively selected from among the source country populations. It also has 
implications for the future of migration from poor countries. As they develop, and the 
poverty constraint erodes, there will be more potential migrants who will be less 
positively selected from the source population. 
The second main finding is that other factors matter just as much as the 
relative return to skills and poverty in source countries. Important among these are 
cultural differences, as reflected by linguistic affinity, and geographic distance. These 
variables are key determinants both of the selection of migrants from a given source 
and the composition of migrants at a given destination. We find that these variables 
                                                 
3 The measure of foreign student intensity is the share of foreign-born among students enrolled in a 
university programmes divided by the share of foreign-born in the population aged over 15. The 
foreign-born share of students (for 1998) in OECD countries was obtained from: 
www.allcountries.org/uscensus/comparative_international _statistics.html.  
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contribute substantially to differences in the education content of migration across 
OECD destinations. However there remain large unexplained components that do not 
seem to correlate with obvious policy differences.  
There are a number of shortcomings in this study that need to be addressed in 
future work. One is the limitation of using data on immigrant stocks that are 
composed of different cohorts of migrants. Observing flows of immigrants over 
periods of, say a decade would allow a better temporal matching of variables. Perhaps 
an even more pressing need is to develop quantitative measures of the policy stance of 
different host countries that are independent of the actual flows of migrants.  
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Table1:  Immigration to the OECD 
Host Country Code 
 
 
Percent of 
OECD 
Migrant 
Stock 
Percent 
Foreign-
born 
Percent of  
Foreign-
born 
Hi-
Educated 
Adjusted 
Foreign-
born 
Percent  
Hi-
Educated 
 
 
Weighted 
Source 
Country Hi-
Educated 
Australia AUS 5.1 26.9 37.9 33.1 16.4
Austria AUT 1.2 13.8 11.3 20.0 11.6
Belgium BEL 1.3 12.0 17.4 24.2 12.7
Canada CAN 7.0 22.4 38.0 32.2 13.5
Switzerland CHE 2.0 24.7 18.6 21.0 13.7
Czech Republic CZE 0.6 5.2 12.5 18.6 11.5
Germany DEU 10.4 13.4 14.9 17.4 11.4
Denmark DNK 0.4 7.5 19.4 27.6 13.2
Spain ESP 2.4 5.9 21.8 24.8 12.8
Finland FIN 0.1 2.7 18.9 31.4 15.9
France FRA 7.4 11.7 18.1 18.7 9.2
United Kingdom GBR 5.9 9.5 30.5 33.0 12.3
Greece GRC 1.3 10.8 15.3 22.1 13.9
Hungary HUN 0.4 3.2 19.8 23.0 10.1
Ireland IRL 0.4 11.0 38.7 37.7 18.8
Italy ITA 2.7 4.1 12.2 25.9 13.0
Japan JPN 1.5 1.1 24.2 34.6 17.6
South Korea KOR 0.2 0.4 32.2 38.1 11.7
Luxembourg LUX 0.2 36.6 18.3 20.4 15.3
Mexico MEX 0.3 0.4 37.1 33.9 29.3
Netherlands NLD 1.6 9.6 17.6 20.6 9.9
Norway NOR 0.4 8.1 22.3 30.5 14.2
New Zealand NZL 0.8 22.5 27.3 34.9 15.4
Poland POL 1.0 2.4 11.7 27.9 15.8
Portugal PRT 0.8 6.7 19.3 24.6 7.8
Slovak Republic SVK 0.2 2.7 14.7 25.6 11.6
Sweden SWE 1.2 14.4 22.3 26.8 13.9
Turkey TUR 1.5 2.4 14.3 20.4 15.9
United States USA 41.7 14.3 25.9 22.8 12.6
Notes: Cols 1-4 based on data underlying Dumont and Lemaître (2004); Col 5 calculated from Barro 
and Lee (2000). The high education share of countries missing in the Barro and Lee data are imputed as 
the (population weighted) average of the other countries in the region.  
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Table 2: Migrants to the OECD by Region 
World Region 
Percent of 
Migrants to 
OECD 
Percent 
High 
Educated 
Migrants 
Source 
Region 
Percent 
High 
Educated 
North America 2.7 43.1 51.5 
Central America 14.8 6.9 10.2 
Caribbean 7.0 19.8 7.8 
South America 5.0 25.9 12.9 
Scandinavia 1.1 31.9 21.4 
UK and Ireland 5.7 36.0 19.9 
Western Europe 8.5 29.5 17.1 
Southern Europe 7.4 12.6 14.4 
Eastern Europe 9.5 17.7 10.6 
Former Soviet Union 3.1 32.5 16.3 
East Asia 7.0 41.0 14.6 
Southeast Asia 6.9 34.3 12.0 
South Asia 4.9 41.8 3.4 
Middle East 5.6 21.2 9.7 
North Africa 5.1 18.1 4.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 32.7 2.4 
Pacific Islands 0.5 18.7 4.6 
Australia and New Zealand 1.0 41.4 37.7 
Notes: Cols 1-2 based on data underlying Dumont and Lemaitre (2004); data classified only by regions 
that are broader than those in the table or are classified as Other are excluded.  Col 3 calculated from 
Barro and Lee (2000); the high education share of countries missing in the Barro and Lee data are 
imputed as the (population weighted) average of the other countries in the region.  
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Table 3: Determinants of skill selection  
Dependent variable: Log (share of high skilled migrants / share of high skilled) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(poverty 
imputed) 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
-0.003 
(0.055) 
0.062    
(0.054) 
0.369 
(0.052)** 
0.334 
(0.048)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.670 
(0.089)** 
0.802 
(0.087)** 
0.647 
(0.076)** 
0.665 
(0.071)** 
Linguistic proximity -0.087 
(0.016)** 
-0.128 
(0.016)** 
-0.128 
(0.014)** 
-0.117 
(0.013)** 
Colonial relationship post 
1945 
0.284 
(0.098)** 
-0.030 
(0.105) 
-0.512 
(0.095)** 
-0.432 
(0.086)** 
Distance (most populated 
cities, 1,000 km) 
0.102 
(0.005)** 
0.124 
(0.006)** 
0.053 
(0.007)** 
0.054 
(0.006)** 
Share of poverty    0.006 
(0.002)* 
0.008 
(0.002)* 
Distance × share in poverty   0.002 
(0.000)** 
0.002 
(0.000)** 
Constant -0.173 
(0.043)** 
-0.824 
(0.130)** 
0.102 
(0.130) 
0.093 
(0.119) 
Observations 1438 1438 1438 1719 
R-squared 0.30 0.39 0.55 0.54 
Country of destination 
dummies 
NO YES YES YES 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In column (4) the 
poverty rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture.  The dependent variable is 
weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination 
country.  
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Table 4: Determinants of skill selection – Poor versus rich countries 
Dependent variable: Log (share of high skilled migrants / share of high skilled) 
 
 (1) 
Rich 
countries 
(poverty 
rate < 5%) 
(2) 
Poor 
countries 
(poverty 
rate >10%) 
(3) 
Poor 
countries 
(poverty 
rate >10%) 
(4) 
Poor 
countries 
(poverty 
rate >10%) 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
0.373 
(0.104)** 
0.226 
(0.072)** 
0.389 
(0.058)** 
0.386 
(0.052)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.589 
(0.088)** 
1.326 
(0.184)** 
0.831 
(0.161)** 
0.953 
(0.137)** 
Linguistic proximity -0.186 
(0.020)** 
-0.104 
(0.034)** 
-0.175 
(0.028)** 
-0.149 
(0.024)** 
Colonial relationship post 1945 - -1.346 
(0.157)** 
-0.953 
(0.129)** 
-0.973 
(0.107)** 
Distance (most populated cities, 
1,000 km) 
0.029 
(0.007)** 
0.176 
(0.011)** 
0.094 
(0.018)** 
0.105 
(0.016)** 
Share of poverty    0.034 
(0.004)** 
0.036 
(0.003)** 
Distance × share in poverty   0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
Constant 0.671 
(0.134)** 
0.099 
(0.232) 
-0.478 
(0.220)* 
-0.387 
(0.186)* 
Observations 563 738 768 977 
R-squared 0.46 0.61 0.75 0.73 
Country of destination dummies YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In column (4) the 
poverty rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture. The dependent variable is 
weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination 
country. 
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Table 5: Determinants of skill selection – Small versus large countries.  
Dependent variable: Log (share of high skilled migrants / share of high skilled) 
 
 (1) 
small 
countries 
(2) 
small  
countries 
(3) 
large 
countries 
(4) 
large  
countries 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
-0.444 
(0.066)** 
-0.075 
(0.070) 
0.133 
(0.082) 
0.369 
(0.080)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.040 
(0.063) 
-0.568 
(0.122)** 
0.881 
(0.146)** 
0.703 
(0.126)** 
Linguistic proximity 0.024 
(0.012) 
0.186 
(0.030)** 
-0.138 
(0.027)** 
-0.145 
(0.025)** 
Colonial relationship post 1945 0.770 
(0.088)** 
0.742 
(0.089)** 
-0.431 
(0.159)** 
-0.782 
(0.141)** 
Distance (most populated cities, 
1,000 km) 
0.041 
(0.005)** 
0.039 
(0.006)** 
0.138 
(0.010)** 
0.043 
(0.011)** 
Share in poverty   0.009 
(0.002)** 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
Distance × share in poverty  0.001 
(0.0003)** 
 0.003 
(0.000)** 
Constant -0.053 
(0.088) 
-0.405 
(0.110)** 
-1.105 
(0.207)** 
0.311 
(0.221) 
Observations 665 571 664 664 
R-squared 0.53 0.63 0.42 0.58 
Country of destination dummies YES YES YES YES 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In columns (3) and (4) 
the poverty rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture. The dependent variable is 
weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination 
country. 
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Table 6: Determinants of source country shares in destination immigration 
Dependent variable: Log (source country migrants/total migrants to destination) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(poverty 
imputed) 
(4) 
(poverty 
imputed) 
Log unskilled wage 
differential 
(destination – source) 
0.386 
(0.092)** 
 0.420 
(0.086)** 
 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
-0.095 
(0.596) 
 -0.120 
(0.562) 
 
Log unskilled wage 
differential + log wage 
premium differential 
 0.416 
(0.089)** 
 0.442 
(0.084)** 
Common official or primary 
language 
0.656 
(0.239)** 
0.537 
(0.151)** 
0.737 
(0.215)** 
0.614 
(0.137)** 
Common language × high 
education share 
-1.118 
(1.416) 
 -1.183 
(1.364) 
 
Linguistic proximity 0.194 
(0.045)** 
0.241 
(0.026)** 
0.214 
(0.041)** 
0.247 
(0.025)** 
Linguistic proximity × high 
education share 
0.400 
(0.292) 
 0.303 
(0.280) 
 
Colonial relationship post 
1945 
2.489 
(0.400)** 
2.347 
(0.321)** 
2.317 
(0.339)** 
2.163 
(0.244)** 
Colonial relationship × high 
education share 
-2.424 
(5.981) 
 0.796 
(3.737) 
 
High education share -2.230 
(1.145) 
-0.914 
(0.819) 
-2.111 
(1.116) 
-0.782 
(0.788) 
Distance (most populated 
cities, 1,000 km) 
-0.169 
(0.022)** 
-0.154 
(0.015)** 
-0.191 
(0.020)** 
-0.166 
(0.013)** 
Distance × high education 
share 
0.258 
(0.094)** 
0.203 
(0.074)** 
0.328 
(0.090)** 
0.235 
(0.069)** 
Share in poverty × low 
education share 
-0.042 
(0.004)** 
-0.039 
(0.002)** 
-0.042 
(0.003)** 
-0.037 
(0.002)** 
Distance × share of poverty × 
low education share 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.001 
(0.000) 
 
Source country population 0.808 
(0.026)** 
0.814 
(0.026)** 
0.858 
(0.022)** 
0.861 
(0.021)** 
Constant -18.604 
(0.468)** 
-18.905 
(0.441)** 
-19.463 
(0.402)** 
-19.746 
(0.370)** 
Observations 1438 1438 1719 1719 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.66 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In column (4) the 
poverty rate is imputed from the share of the labour force in agriculture.  The standard errors are 
clustered by source countries.  
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Table 7: Counterfactual analysis of Proportion of High-Educated Immigrants in OECD Countries 
 
 
(1) 
Actual 
Hi-Ed 
share 
 
(2) 
Education 
selectivity 
 
 
(3) 
Source 
country 
composition 
 
(4) 
Low wage 
differential 
 
 
(5) 
Premium 
differential 
 
 
(6) 
Colonial 
links 
 
 
(7) 
Common 
language 
 
 
(8) 
Linguistic 
proximity 
 
 
(9) 
Distance 
 
 
 
(10) 
Destination 
Country 
Dummy 
 
(11) 
Share 
sample in 
total 
migration 
Australia 39.34 5.69 2.37 0.01 -2.38 0.07 8.62 -5.21 18.85 0.62 73.62 
Austria 14.61 -7.68 0.97 0.04 0.49 0.02 1.58 -0.18 -2.75 -6.18 52.47 
Belgium 16.58 -4.50 0.84 0.01 -0.03 0.15 3.15 -3.40 -2.97 -1.76 75.39 
Canada 37.08 12.21 1.59 0.04 -1.95 0.09 7.58 -6.88 7.78 9.30 69.97 
Denmark 22.22 -1.96 -0.28 0.05 -2.44 0.10 -1.82 -0.14 -2.97 5.29 61.38 
France 16.77 -0.59 -3.71 0.03 -0.09 -0.62 1.85 -1.75 -3.51 2.20 75.44 
Hungary 18.50 6.71 -0.37 0.00 0.68 0.00 -0.58 3.26 -4.80 6.71 61.28 
Ireland 38.21 14.37 -3.50 0.01 -1.85 -0.04 8.90 -12.04 -6.04 16.04 87.62 
Italy 12.90 -10.89 -0.63 -0.01 0.05 0.10 -1.14 -0.23 -1.60 -7.30 65.73 
Japan 27.85 -7.49 -0.33 0.05 -2.85 0.10 -2.59 2.94 6.22 6.04 53.12 
Luxembourg 19.26 -9.51 0.78 0.12 0.43 0.00 4.49 -4.79 -3.35 -6.53 88.17 
Mexico 38.91 -7.36 7.90 -0.05 7.06 0.02 1.96 6.20 -2.08 -12.62 80.73 
New Zealand 30.13 -4.03 1.68 0.02 2.67 0.05 8.18 -7.57 16.11 -22.18 69.97 
Norway 27.06 1.69 -0.86 0.04 -2.24 0.12 -2.38 -0.19 -2.99 8.81 64.62 
Portugal 21.42 8.54 -0.18 0.00 2.83 0.79 1.64 -3.90 -3.62 10.60 52.21 
Spain 25.34 0.47 -0.53 0.01 0.40 0.08 0.84 -2.22 -2.81 3.22 66.16 
Sweden 23.23 0.35 -2.47 0.00 -3.18 0.03 -1.09 -2.56 -3.16 5.92 64.51 
Switzerland 21.76 -2.40 -2.97 0.06 0.16 0.04 3.15 -8.28 -3.76 0.45 68.78 
Turkey 14.58 -7.13 -5.71 -0.02 -0.48 0.15 -1.41 -1.96 -3.08 -3.00 78.12 
United Kingdom 31.52 7.86 -2.43 0.00 1.42 -2.31 4.33 -4.50 -3.83 10.94 66.49 
United States 24.68 -4.95 7.62 0.23 1.08 1.05 4.12 4.37 -2.75 -9.06 66.82 
 
Note: the percentage of immigrants with high education reported in column (1) differs from that reported in Table 1 because the latter covers only immigrants 
from source countries that are represented in our regression analysis. The percentage of all immigrants represented by these countries is reported in column (11). 
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Data Appendix 
Migrant skills. The data that we use for immigrants is that constructed at the OECD by 
Dumont and Lemaître (2004), as noted in the text. Our measure of migrant skills is the 
share of the foreign born aged 15 and above having some tertiary education. Education is 
classified into four levels: high, medium, low and unknown. We take the high educated 
as a share of the total, assuming that those for whom education is unknown would be 
either low or medium educated. Taking the high educated as a share of those for whom 
the education level is known makes very little difference to the results reported above. 
This share is available by source country for each OECD destination although in a few 
cases some of the source countries are aggregated together by region. In the regression 
analysis we use only the observations for individual source countries.  
Source country skills. In order to calculate the share of high educated in each source 
country we take the number aged 15 and over with some post-secondary education in the 
year 2000 from Barro and Lee (2000), available at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. For those source countries that are 
represented in the data on migrants but not in the Barro and Lee data, we have imputed 
the number of high educated by applying the average ratio of high educated in other 
countries in the same region, using the regions listed in Table 2. The countries omitted in 
Barro and Lee are generally very small and are not likely to affect our results. In order to 
obtain the population at risk we add back the emigrants by skill level so that the base 
population for each source country includes those who have emigrated. This assumes that 
emigration of the highly educated does not generate more education among those who 
did not emigrate. If there is an educational response, as some of the recent literature 
suggests, then our calculation will overestimate the counterfactual no-migration skill ratio 
in the base population. If on the other hand we assume complete offset then the 
appropriate ratio would be the same as in the unadjusted Barro and Lee data (although the 
absolute numbers would differ).  
Skill premium. We use data from the Occupation Wages around the World database, 
constructed by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/oww/. 
The data include standardized wage information for 161 occupations in over 150 
countries from 1983 to 2003 and is based on the ILO October Inquiry that asks 
governments to yearly report wages for a wide range of occupations. The ILO dataset is 
not directly usable because of the lack of comparability in reported wage formats across 
countries and over time. Freeman and Oostendorp corrected the data in such a way that 
wages could be made comparable across occupations, countries and over time.  
Given that occupations may differ in their skill requirements across countries, we choose 
to construct a skill premium measure based on occupations that are either highly-skilled 
(and do require at least some tertiary education) and unskilled occupations, which 
according to the ILO description “require a minimum of training or no previous 
experience”.  We calculated a premium for each country and year, based on the average 
wages in all available occupations in each skill level. We use the country average over 
the period 1983-2003 as a measure of the skill premium. While this goes some way 
towards capturing the skill premium over the longer run, it must be noted that there are 
missing values for certain country/years. For Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, 
Japan, Switzerland and the Slovak Republic, where insufficient observations are available 
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we used the predicted value of the premium based on a regression of the premium on the 
gini coefficient in 20 OECD destination countries.  
Poverty. The proportion of the source country population living on less than $2 per day 
comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2006 at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section2.htm. These measures are for a 
single year between 1995 and 2003. The imputed poverty measure corresponds to the 
predicted value of poverty from a linear regression of poverty on the average share of 
agriculture in GDP over 1950-2000.  Share of Agriculture in GDP from World Bank, 
average share for the years 1950-2000. 
Distance. Distance in kilometres between capital cities, taken from Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, at: http://www. 
cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
Common language dummy. Dummy equal to 1 for pairs of countries sharing a common 
official language. Source: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
Language proximity. Values from 1 to 5 calculated from the number of common nodes in 
the linguistic tree between the closest official languages of pairs of countries (based on 
the language classification tree of the Ethnologue).  
Colonial Links. Dummy equal to 1 for pairs sharing a colonial link after 1945. Source : 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. 
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Source: See text.  
Source: See text 
 
Fig 2: Percent of Immigrants High Educated and Wage Premium, 
OECD Countries 2001
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Figure 3: Difference between High Education Percent for Emigrants 
and  Non-Emigrants and Wage Premium, Source Countries 2001
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